Where the Reset Goes

November 20, 2026 · 7 min read

The screen is small and polite. A padlock icon, a line of text, a box for the code. "We sent a verification code to j•••••@gmail.com." Below it, a link: didn't get it? Resend.

The practice's name is not on that screen, and neither is the name of anyone who works there now. The dots hide an address that belonged to someone who set the account up, and the system, doing exactly what it was built to do, is sending the key to the only place it was ever told to send it.

Every login a practice has sits on top of another one. Behind the password is the place the reset goes, and whoever can read that inbox or answer that phone can get into the account, whatever the user list says. This post is about that second credential, the one nobody wrote down because nobody thought of it as a credential.

A hand holding a locked smartphone showing the lock screen

Photo: I'm Zion on Pexels

Four systems, in their own words

The practice management systems do not all treat the reset the same way, and the difference is worth knowing before you go looking.

Dentrix, the on-premise product, describes a person rather than an inbox. Its help page on passwords says "the first step in setting up security is to enable passwords and set up a password administrator," and this blog quoted its advice to name a second one. The page says nothing about email. When a team member forgets her password, the fix comes from a password administrator in the building, not from an inbox.

Open Dental works the same way. Its manual's page on editing a user offers a Change Password option for the user who cannot remember hers, a checkbox that will "prompt the user to reset their password upon logging in," and a button for the locked-out user that lets her "attempt logging in to Open Dental again immediately." All of it is done by someone with the right permission, at the practice. No code is sent anywhere.

Dentrix Ascend is a cloud product, and the cloud changes the answer. Its page on the enhanced security login says: "When you log in to Dentrix Ascend, you're prompted to enter a one-time code that is sent to your email address." It also says: "Each user must have a unique email address," and that the added verification "cannot be enabled for user accounts that share the same email address." The forgotten password goes the same direction: "If you can't remember your password, click the Forgot Password link to reset your password." In Ascend the inbox is the credential; the vendor's own page sends both the login code and the forgotten password there.

CareStack, also in the cloud, adds the detail that matters most. Its help article on managing users said, when this blog last read it, that "Only users with Add/Edit Users permission will be able to edit the Email address." Check the current page, but the point holds either way: changing where the reset goes is itself a permissioned act, and the permission belongs to the role this blog described in its post on the administrator login.

The inbox nobody owns

So in the cloud, the question "who can get into this account" has a second answer, and it is the address on the user's profile. In a lot of practices that address is one of a few things, none of them chosen.

It is the former office manager's personal address, because she set the account up when the practice signed on and used the email she already had open. This blog's post on the team member who knows everything, and what leaves with her, covered the knowledge side; this is one of the things that stays behind in her name. This blog's post on what access ends when someone leaves put her practice inbox on the list; her personal inbox, when a reset points at it, is the harder case, because the practice cannot take it over.

It is the IT company's address, because the technician was the one at the keyboard during setup and the field needed something.

It is a shared practice inbox that the whole front desk reads, which means a code meant to prove one person's identity is visible to everyone who opens the mail that morning.

Or it is the owner's personal address, on a phone that spends the day in a drawer in an operatory, so that a locked-out scheduling coordinator waits for a reset code that has already arrived somewhere she cannot see.

None of those is a scandal. Each is the system sending the key where it was told to. Nobody told it on purpose.

Reading the profile, not the login

You do not have to trigger a reset to learn where it would go. Each of these systems has a user profile showing the email address and, where the system uses one, the phone number on file. Someone with the top role opens each user, reads those two fields, and writes down what they say.

The list that comes out is short and usually surprising: on one page, the person the vendor would send a code to is often not the person who sits at that desk.

The same exercise goes beyond the practice management software. The bank's portal, the payroll service, the phone system, the texting service, the imaging software, the practice's social pages and its own email domain all have a recovery address or a recovery phone number, and the practice's email account is the one to look at hardest, because every other reset points at it. Whoever holds the recovery address for the practice's email holds the credential behind every credential.

Moving it

Moving the reset is less work than it sounds, and more decision.

The work is a field on a profile, changed by someone with the role to change it, one system at a time. Where a vendor requires a unique address per user, as Ascend does, the practice gives each team member her own practice address rather than sharing one, which it should have done anyway.

The decision is who the practice's own email recovery points to. This blog's post on the one individual responsible for security argued that final responsibility sits with one named person, and the recovery address for the practice's domain is the clearest case of something that should sit under that name. Not the IT company's. Not the office manager's personal account. A practice address, or a phone number the practice controls, that stays the practice's the day anyone leaves.

Then the field goes on the page this blog has been describing, beside the vendor's word for the top role and who holds it: for each system, where the reset goes. The codes never go on the page. The addresses do; an address is where the key is sent, not the key itself.

Where it goes

Laine, the AI receptionist in AiroDental, is one more account with an email address on its profile, and that address should be the practice's. Saige, the team-facing assistant, is where the page lives, so the office manager who finds the screen with the dots can ask whose inbox that is and get the practice's own answer.

There is no long-term contract and no onboarding fee. See how the modules fit together.

Deren Flesher, DDS. Founder, AiroDental.

Frequently asked questions

What happens when a dental software password reset email goes to a former employee?
The reset goes where the account was told to send it. If the email address on a user's profile is a former team member's, the code or the reset link arrives in an inbox the practice does not control, and the person who holds that inbox can finish the reset. For cloud systems that send login codes to email, the inbox is in effect a second password. The fix is to read the email and phone fields on each user profile and change any that point outside the practice.
Does every practice management system send reset codes by email?
No, and the difference is worth knowing. Dentrix (the on-premise product) describes a password administrator who holds the role inside the practice; its help page on passwords says nothing about email. Open Dental's manual describes a Change Password option, a checkbox that prompts a user to reset her password at her next login, and an unlock button, all done by someone with the right permission at the practice. Dentrix Ascend, a cloud product, sends a one-time login code to the user's email address and requires a unique address per user. CareStack's help article, when this blog last read it, said only users with Add/Edit Users permission can edit the email address on a user.
How do I find out where our resets go without locking anyone out?
Do not click Forgot Password. Have someone with the top role open each user's profile and read the email address and, where the system uses one, the phone number on file. Write both down for every user and every system, including the bank, payroll, the phone system, the texting service, the imaging software, the social pages and the practice's own email account. That page is usually the first time a practice sees that the address the vendor would send a code to is not the person at that desk.
Whose email address should be on the practice's accounts?
A practice address for each team member, not a shared inbox and not anyone's personal account, where the vendor allows one per user. For the practice's own email domain, the recovery address and phone should sit with the one named person responsible for security, at an address or number the practice controls and keeps the day anyone leaves. This blog's post on the one individual covers why one name.
How do Laine and Saige fit into this?
Laine, the AI receptionist in AiroDental, is one more account with an email address on its profile, and that address should be the practice's. Saige, the team-facing assistant, is where the page listing each system's reset address lives, so an office manager who finds a code screen with a masked address can ask whose inbox it is and get the practice's own answer. The codes themselves never go on the page.

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